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Army wives in the eastern DRC
Maria Eriksson Baaz and Judith Verweijen
We hAve tRAvelleD a lot on these frontlines. A lot. Many have died. the soldiers 
have finished here. Some in combat, but many simply out of hardship and hunger 
[pasi na nzala]. And many of us women have died too, and our children … We are 
really suffering here – far from home in a foreign land [mboka ya batu]. how can we 
survive here? Should we start to go naked or start stealing? We are here, but the 
government says it does not know us. It says it does not know us [bayebi biso te], the 
wives of soldiers.1 
these are the words of Chantal,2 the 60-year-old wife of a Congolese army lieutenant 
stationed in Uvira territory, South Kivu. Both she and her husband originate from equateur, 
in the western part of the country. For the past 40 years Chantal has been on the move 
with her husband, following him on his various deployments. During this period she has not 
been able to visit her family back home and has no contact with them. 
She explains that in the time of Mobutu, when her husband’s service began, there were 
no cell phones and as a result she lost contact. Going back to visit is impossible since the 
journey is very long and the family has no money. her husband should have been retired 
a long time ago but, since there are no guaranteed retirement funds and they cannot live 
Summary
the wives of soldiers of the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique 
du Congo (FARDC, Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo) 
may not be very visible, but they are an integral part of the military. they live 
with soldiers, and often their children, in and around military camps and 
deployment sites – including in the most insecure zones. the military, 
however, defines them as civilians and does not provide them with any 
benefits packages, nor does it invest much in facilities like health care 
centres. together with soldiers’ low and irregular pay, this causes army wives 
to struggle to make a living.     
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without his meagre salary, he keeps working. Consequently, Chantal is forced to 
continue to live ‘in foreign lands’, as she describes her status as an outsider. 
While emphasising her daily hardships, Chantal still believes that she has been 
lucky compared with many of her friends: ‘At least my husband is still alive, so I am 
not alone.’  
While Chantal’s story is unusual in the light of the extensive time – four decades – 
she has spent following her husband on various deployments, many FARDC wives 
share similar experiences and living conditions. Due to the difficult service conditions 
of army personnel and the absence of family benefits packages, many spouses 
are either isolated from their husbands for years or follow them on deployment to 
insecure zones, often with their children. 
Officially the FARDC has a policy of mouvement sans 
famille, implying that families are not allowed to follow 
their husbands on deployment into operational zones
MAny ARMy WIveS leAD 
A noMADIC exIStenCe, 
exACeRBAtInG AlReADy 
DIRe lIvInG ConDItIonS
officially the FARDC has a policy of mouvement sans famille, implying that families 
are not allowed to follow their husbands on deployment into operational zones. 
however, in reality, many do so, although practices vary according to the military 
region and unit. Frequent rotations of army units mean that many army wives lead 
a nomadic existence, exacerbating already dire living conditions. Despite these 
hardships, army wives are by no means passive victims. Most struggle courageously 
to maintain a basic standard of living for their families, engaging in a range of income-
earning activities. In doing so, they make use of their status as army wives, for 
example, claiming privileges like tax exemptions or engaging in illicit activities.
Sources
this report addresses the situation of army wives and widows in the DR Congo, 
in particular, but not exclusively, in the war-torn east. It is based on data collected 
in october 2014 in Uvira territory,3 where 75 military wives were interviewed, both 
individually and in groups. 
Data were also gathered from more than 100 civilians, through focus groups, key 
informant interviews and semi-structured surveys of small-scale economic operators. 
however, the report also draws on data and insights obtained through years of 
research, conducted for a variety of other research projects, into the FARDC and 
civilian-military interactions.4
the report is structured as follows: the remainder of this section provides a number 
of conceptual clarifications. the first part presents a snapshot of the FARDC, 
which allows the data to be placed in context. We subsequently describe the main 
dilemma army wives face, namely, whether to stay behind or follow their husbands 
on deployment. this is followed by a discussion of the particular challenges faced 
by women who decide to go with their husbands. the next sections focus on army 
wives’ housing conditions, their relationships with civilians and the various strategies 
they use to earn a living. We then discuss the specific difficulties faced by army 
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widows. the report ends with a discussion of the most 
important policy areas that need to be addressed in order to 
improve the situation of army wives and their families. 
Army wives: some clarifications
When discussing army wives some initial clarifications are 
necessary. First, the fact that this report focuses on wives 
does not imply that there are no male army spouses. however, 
male spouses were not encountered at any of the research 
sites. only a small portion of FARDC personnel are women 
– slightly more than 2.5% in 2013.5 Furthermore, since many 
female soldiers are married to other army personnel (and 
official same sex partnerships do not exist) there are not many 
male civilian spouses. 
Second, it is important to emphasise that the category of 
‘military wives’ is very diverse, encompassing women from 
different socio-economic and geographic backgrounds, 
with varying professions and lifestyles. the wives of superior 
officers live in conditions that differ radically from those of the 
wives of the rank and file, who belong to the poorest strata 
of Congolese society. there is no natural solidarity between 
these groups. As the wife of a soldier explained: ‘the wives of 
soldiers are divided. those of officers are very proud [kiburi], 
they always place themselves above the others.’6 While this 
report considers military wives in general, the focus is on the 
wives of lower-ranking officers and the rank and file. 
there are also important differences in the nature of these 
women’s relationships with army personnel. While some 
women are formally married, meaning that their husbands 
have paid the dowry to the woman’s family (registration at 
the Civil Registry is rare), others are more like mistresses or 
girlfriends, which does not exclude the couple having had 
children together. 
soldiers’ long-term partners and are often not recognised as 
spouses by the administration of army units. While, in this report, 
we simply refer to ‘army wives’ to designate the group as a 
whole, this wide range of often shifting statuses should be kept 
in mind. 
third, while the report considers the situation of army wives, it 
does not only present the voices of these women themselves. In 
order to present a more balanced picture and go beyond simple 
narratives of victimhood,7 the report is also based on interviews 
with soldiers and civilians. Moreover, army wives should not be 
understood as a strictly separate group whose earning strategies 
and daily struggles are isolated from those of their husbands 
or the civilians among whom they live. By demonstrating this 
interconnectedness the report emphasises the need for a holistic 
and relational approach that places these women firmly in both 
their civilian and military contexts. 
The predicament of the Congo’s military
the FARDC is a young military force. Born in 2003 out of a 
difficult merger of former warring factions, it had a troubled 
start. Constant influxes of rebel soldiers, factional strife, poor 
management and strong ties to extra-military political-commercial 
networks undermined command, control and cohesion.8 
these growing pains were compounded by an unfortunate 
heritage: the Congo has no tradition of well-organised and 
well-functioning armed forces that offer citizens security.9 
Furthermore, deployment to ongoing combat operations in the 
war-torn east has consistently diverted resources and attention 
from reform efforts.
Despite these difficulties, there have been a number of 
achievements in recent years, such as the adoption of a new 
Code of Conduct, the (re)opening of various military training 
centres and investments in military justice. yet the effectiveness 
of the FARDC continues to be limited, mitigating its track 
record in keeping civilians secure. one reason for this is a lack 
of resources. 
the FARDC has only minimal infrastructure such as barracks or 
health care facilities and service and social conditions are poor. 
like wages in other state services in the Congo, those in the 
army are very low, ranging at present between US$85 and 100 a 
month.10 While there have been salary increases over the years, 
the present sum is far from sufficient for even a small family to 
live off. Moreover, payments continue to be irregular and military 
personnel frequently go unpaid for two or three months.11  
In addition to limited and irregular wages, there are no social 
benefits, family allowances or pensions. Furthermore, soldiers 
have to pay for a portion of health care and other basic 
Army wives should not be understood 
as a separate group whose daily 
struggles are isolated from those of 
their husbands
like army personnel in many other contexts globally, it is 
common for FARDC soldiers with partners back home to 
develop relationships with women at deployment sites. 
Although the situation differs from case to case, the 
relationship with these women is often broken off when the 
soldiers are redeployed elsewhere. Such local girlfriends, who 
remain in or close to their area of origin, differ in status from 
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necessities themselves. Basic items needed for everyday life and professional 
functioning, such as soap, basins for washing, blankets and phone credits, are 
not provided by the military. In combination with other factors, including erratic 
accountability systems, weak unit cohesion and limited training, such poor service 
conditions cause members of the FARDC to regularly behave badly. Civilians report 
incidents of extortion, illegal taxation, arbitrary arrests and physical abuses such as 
torture and rape. however, the nature and frequency of these abuses differ according 
to the military unit and context.12
Despite being a source of insecurity at times, the presence of the FARDC helps keep 
the plethora of armed groups that litter the country’s east at bay. this was evidenced 
in 2012-2013, when massive numbers of troops were deployed in operations against 
the rebel movement M23 in north Kivu. Where the military withdrew, armed groups 
rapidly took over the vacated spaces. In many areas abandoned by the military, 
people indicated that they would prefer the FARDC to return, even though they feared 
its behaviour.13 
hence, while the army has been cited as engaging in abuses, it is also recognised as 
providing basic protection. this reflects the ambivalence of civilians’ attitudes towards 
the FARDC, which is seen as difficult to live with, but often more difficult to live without.
While there is a great need for army reform, neither the DRC government nor 
international donors have, thus far, pursued a coherent reform agenda based on a 
long-term strategy and integrated vision. Rather, military policies have been ad hoc, 
inconsistent and poorly coordinated, in part because they have often been induced or 
diverted by military crises. 
Why would women expose themselves to such 
dangers and choose a difficult and unstable 
nomadic existence?
the CoSt oF A RoUnD tRIp 
FRoM KInShASA to the 
eASt. thIS IS MoRe thAn 
FIve tIMeS the Monthly 
SAlARy oF MAny SolDIeRS
$500
Crucially, reform efforts have rarely been backed by sustained political and financial 
commitment. Furthermore, attention to structural reforms, like logistics and 
administration, has been modest. Rather, both donors and the government have 
prioritised classic train-and-equip approaches.14 
Finally, army reform has paid relatively little attention to improving the conditions of 
military personnel and their families. this is an important omission, as the effectiveness 
of other reforms partly depends on progress in this area: as long as soldiers are 
preoccupied with surviving and the fate of their families, interventions like training and 
education will have a limited impact. 
A difficult dilemma: stay or leave? 
As observed above, the FARDC’s official policy of mouvement sans famille is 
generally not respected, leading to a situation where many women are present near 
the frontlines. 
Why would women expose themselves to such dangers and choose a difficult and 
unstable nomadic existence? there are no easy answers to this question, as many 
considerations play a role, often in varying combinations. these relate to both ‘push 
factors’, or circumstances that force army wives to quit their home area, and ‘pull 
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factors’, which make following their husbands on deployment a 
more attractive option than staying at home.
one of the most important push factors is the difficulties 
soldiers, especially those deployed in the east, experience 
in obtaining leave. Because of the ongoing war and military 
operations, superiors tend to be reluctant to let personnel go. 
Despite the existence of formal guidelines, the discretion to 
grant leave ultimately lies with individual commanders. 
even when they are given leave, soldiers may still not be able 
to visit their families. those who live far away often cannot 
bear the costs of travel, or cannot complete the journey within 
the allotted time. the degeneration of road infrastructure in 
the Congo has made it impossible to travel overland from the 
eastern to the western part of the country and airfare is relatively 
expensive. A round trip from Kinshasa to the east may cost 
more than US$500, which is over five times the monthly salary 
of many soldiers. Moreover, there are no transport allowances 
for leave. therefore, soldiers from the western Congo deployed 
to the east are often not able to return to their zone of origin to 
visit their families. this leads to a situation that many call divorce 
forcé (forced divorce). 
Some soldiers have not seen their families for over a decade. 
For example, soldiers in the naval unit at lake Albert, deployed 
there in 2004 from Kinshasa, said they had never been able to 
go home. As a lower-ranked officer explained: 
We arrived when we were still too small, too young 
[encore trop petit] … and now we have become grown up 
[devenus trop grands], but we do not see our families, we 
have children and family that have never seen their fathers 
nor their brothers … Many of us have married here again. 
We do not even know our wives anymore.15 
Because of these difficulties, many army wives know that if they 
do not follow their husbands on deployment they are unlikely 
ever to see them again or to receive any income. For a variety of 
reasons, including low salaries, debt and competing priorities, 
soldiers often send money home very irregularly. In some cases 
they even stop sending it altogether. the fact that transferring 
money is problematic, especially in the most remote deployment 
areas, further increases the problem. 
Fearing that soldiers might stop sending money home, family 
members and in-laws often pressurise army wives to follow their 
husbands. the pressure is sometimes aggravated by anger 
over the non- or partial payment of dowries. Another reason 
why families prefer army wives to leave is the stigma associated 
with having a daughter married to a soldier. like the military, 
army wives (at least those of the rank and file) tend to have 
quite a bad reputation in the Congo, being seen as ill-behaved 
and immoral. For the same reason, military wives experience 
difficulties in finding new civilian husbands once they have been 
abandoned or widowed.
In addition to these ‘push factors’ there are several pull factors. 
Many of the women interviewed said they simply prefer to be 
near their husband because they love them. In addition, they 
want their children to grow up with a father. these are also 
important reasons why soldiers encourage their wives to follow 
them on deployment. 
Army wives follow their husbands on 
deployment for various financial and 
family-related reasons, but not all of 
them end up at the frontlines
Army personnel generally displayed a strong commitment to 
taking care of their children. As one major commented: ‘My 
children need a father. When they do not see their father for 
so long, they become alienated from us. they lose paternal 
affection.’16 Many soldiers also worry that their wives will start 
cheating on them if they leave them behind. According to one 
corporal from Kinshasa, stationed with his wife in Goma: 
life here is hard for us, particularly my wife. She misses her 
family back home, but I brought her with me. you know, 
women are weak [faible]. We men are also weak in that 
respect, but women are even weaker I think. If you leave 
her for too long, she will start meeting other men.17 
Many of the army wives who have followed their husbands gave 
similar reasons, saying they had done so partly because they 
feared that their husbands would otherwise meet other women 
and abandon them. As a wife of a sergeant in Uvira put it: 
leaving my husband? never. Don’t you know how men 
are? too light-footed/like prostitutes [kindumba trop], 
especially soldiers. even if you live together they find it 
hard to resist the temptations with other women. If you 
do not follow, they will find another woman and forget you 
and the children.18
In sum, army wives follow their husbands on deployment for 
various financial, affective and family-related reasons. But not 
all of them end up at the frontlines. the more well-to-do officers 
often install their families in bigger and relatively safer towns, 
such as Goma and Bukavu. Moreover, some region, sector 
or unit commanders try to prevent that women follow their 
husbands to the most dangerous areas, encouraging them 
to stay in towns nearby. this enables these women to visit 
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their husbands occasionally to spend time with them, collect a part of their pay and 
bring them food and items from town. other commanders are more tolerant, and do 
allow women, usually spouses of rank-and-file soldiers with few means, to live in the 
operational zones. 
The hardships of continuous rotation
Both the army wives who follow their husbands and those who stay behind face a 
number of challenges. While this section focuses on wives who are continuously on 
the move, their living conditions are not necessarily more difficult than those of the 
women who remain behind. 
In the course of our research we encountered many women in the latter category who 
struggle to make ends meet and have very little or no contact with their husbands. 
one army wife in Kinshasa, who opted to stay because she and her husband were 
worried about the safety of their children in the volatile east, said she now regretted the 
choice. She had not seen her husband for seven years and had received no money 
from him for the past two years. What is worse, she had heard from others that he had 
married another woman in the east. none of her six children went to school and she 
was soon to be thrown out of the military camp where she was staying for free.19 
ARMy WIveS oFten pAy FoR 
tRAnSpoRt By SellInG All 
theIR hoUSeholD IteMS
Aside from the hardships of the journey, each time 
army wives arrive in a new area they have to start 
all over again
the women who stay behind do have the advantage of being closer to their families 
and the potential social safety nets they provide. Furthermore, they do not have to 
travel as frequently as the women who follow their husbands. this applies especially 
to the spouses of soldiers in infantry units involved in military operations, who may 
be redeployed once a year or every other year, sometimes over vast distances. one 
woman said she had had to travel hundreds of kilometres from Mbandaka to Kisangani 
to Goma while pregnant, taking her two small children with her.20
the difficulties these travels entail were among the most frequently cited problems 
faced by army wives. the military does not generally pay for dependants’ 
displacements, or help with travel arrangements. only a few units have a type of 
voluntary contribution scheme for shared transport. In such cases the commander 
rents a vehicle and deducts the costs from the salaries of the soldiers whose wives 
want to travel in the vehicle.21 
In many other cases, soldiers simply move ahead with their unit to comply with orders, 
leaving their wives and children behind. the wife must then find the means to pay 
for transport. this is frequently done by selling all their household items, which, in 
any case, they would not be able to take with them because of limited space in the 
vehicles. As one woman testified: 
each time we travel, we have to improvise and we have to sell all our goods, 
mattresses, pots and pans, household appliances, even mobile phones; anything 
to cover the costs of transport. We end up with nothing.22  
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25 September 2015, five army wives were killed and two were 
wounded in the Rumangabo camp in Rutshuru in a raid carried 
out by an armed group.25 While living in military camps may 
be dangerous, living among civilians is not necessarily a better 
option, as it also has a number of disadvantages.
Difficulties with housing
Reflecting a long-standing tradition in the Congolese armed 
forces, army wives are entitled to live in the barracks. however, 
like military personnel, many in fact live elsewhere. this is 
not only because of the relative scarcity of barracks but also 
because many wives simply prefer not to live there because of 
the poor conditions. however, there are important differences in 
living conditions at different sites, partly depending on whether 
donor money has been used for recent upgrades.
While housing in military barracks is supposed to be free of 
charge and often is, in some cases, fees have to be paid due 
to informal arrangements.26 Furthermore, certain camps are 
overcrowded, leading to poor hygiene, a lack of privacy and 
peace, and frequent conflicts between military families. As one 
woman explained: 
I have stayed in a camp. Some camps are good, but 
others are bad. Just too many people and too many 
conflicts [makelele eleki]. I prefer to stay as we do 
now [renting a civilian house] even if it is difficult to pay 
the rent.27 
In many cases, twice or three times the prescribed number of 
people live in one apartment/room. In addition, only some of 
the families, usually those of officers, live in apartments in brick 
houses, which may also be overcrowded. numerous others get 
by in tents, hangars or wooden shed-like constructions within 
the compound of the camp.
Apart from the housing conditions, the quantity and quality of 
amenities in barracks, such as water points, health care centres, 
schools and electricity, vary enormously.28 these variations are 
well documented in a study conducted by the human rights 
organisation Association Africaine des Droits de l’Homme 
(ASADho), among military camps in Kinshasa in 2014. 
ASADho found that whereas some camps had sufficient water 
points, camp CetA had one tap, which worked only on a few 
days a week, between 3am and 5am. Consequently, families 
had to fetch water from the river or buy it for US$0.32 per 25 
litres. the study also found that the quality of the schools in 
the camps was poor. Furthermore, for some parents, the fees 
were too high, varying between US$55 and US$165 a year for 
primary schools. As a result, parents either did not send their 
children to school at all or sent them to schools outside the 
Because their living environment is 
constantly changing, the education of 
military children tends to get disrupted
Because they have to move at short notice, the wives rarely 
have enough time to negotiate a good price for the items they 
sell. Furthermore, when a unit leaves collectively there is a 
glut of second-hand household items in a certain area, which 
further depresses the price. the result is that the women sustain 
substantial losses. 
Aside from the hardships of the journey, each time army wives 
arrive in a new area they have to start all over again: searching 
for a house, buying new household items, finding new revenue-
generating opportunities, making new friends. Frequent 
displacement also exacts a heavy toll on children. Many women 
who follow their husband on deployment bring small children 
with them. older children are often left with relatives or an older 
sibling, either in the area of origin of the parents or in a bigger 
town near the husband’s deployment area. 
Because their living environment is constantly changing, the 
education of military children tends to get disrupted. Moreover, 
there is often no money to pay school fees. While some schools 
will not allow children to attend if their parents are unable to 
pay the fees, others are more benevolent. Many civilians 
understand the plight of military families and blame their 
situation on the government, not on the families themselves. 
Consequently, they try to be accommodating. As a school 
teacher in luberizi explained: ‘When it is children of military we 
do not immediately chase them away when their parents do not 
pay. We try to be patient [kuvumilia] and wait till they have found 
the money.’23 
however, many children eventually drop out of school and some 
end up on the streets, having been abandoned by their parents. 
It is a widely held belief that there are many children of soldiers 
among the shégués (street children) in the big cities, although it 
is difficult to substantiate these claims.
In addition to the difficulties of frequent travel and changing 
environments, families who follow their husbands/fathers on 
deployment are exposed to insecurity – attacks on FARDC 
camps by enemy forces are frequent. For example, in April 2012 
eight army wives and four children were seriously wounded 
when a group of Mai Mai combatants managed to penetrate 
camp oZACAF, located in the town of Beni.24 As recently as 
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barracks. only one military camp has a school that does not charge, the infamous 
‘Ecole du banc’ in Camp Kokolo, in Kinshasa, so called because of the absence of 
benches for the pupils. 
A similar situation pertains in relation to health care. While in most camps there is 
a hospital or health care centre, in many cases the costs of medical care, even at 
reduced tariffs, is still prohibitive. Furthermore, the quality is often assessed as poor, 
since many military health care structures have limited medical equipment and cannot 
provide specialised care. Consequently, those who can afford it seek better quality 
care elsewhere.
In the WAR-toRn eASt, 
MoSt SolDIeRS AnD 
theIR FAMIlIeS Do not lIve 
In BARRACKS
Many soldiers live in makeshift camps. Some live in 
tents and others stay in self-built manyata (huts) made 
from bamboo sticks, mud and banana leaves
In the war-torn east, which has the highest concentration of FARDC troops, most 
soldiers and their families do not live in barracks. especially in rural areas, a large 
number live in makeshift camps. Some live in tents and others stay in self-built manyata 
(huts) made from bamboo sticks, mud and banana leaves. these fragile constructions 
can often not withstand heavy rainfall and, in colder climates, fail to provide sufficient 
warmth. Moreover, soldiers are rarely given tarpaulins to make the huts more robust. 
living in such conditions can prove especially difficult for families with babies and 
young children, who easily fall ill.
Some military families live in civilian homes, a widespread practice among the 
Congolese military. even when they do not have their families with them, soldiers tend 
to rent rooms and houses in towns and villages, the costs varying according to the 
place and category of house. For example, in Uvira territory, monthly rent ranges from 
about US$5 for a simple room and US$10-15 for a very basic house to US$35-50 for 
higher quality houses. While the rent often places pressure on the household budget, 
many families prefer to live in civilian houses because of the enhanced privacy and 
better conditions for children.
Relationships with host communities
the large-scale presence of military personnel and their families in civilian residential 
areas has significant consequences for civilian-military (family) relations. Importantly, 
this intermingling fosters friendships that can contribute to breaking down negative 
stereotypes. yet, in many areas, especially in the rural zones where local communities 
are relatively closed, army wives are generally regarded as strangers. As was explained 
during a focus group: 
Wife A: there is discrimination [ubaguzi] by the local population, they call us 
watokambali [those who come from far].
Wife B: the women in the local community do not like us. And they start speaking 
the local languages to cheat us at the market, so they can raise the price and talk 
behind our backs. they don’t like newcomers [bakujakuja].29  
Furthermore, reflecting the historically poor reputation of the armed forces alluded to 
above, many civilians believe that army wives have the same bad character attributed 
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to their husbands, implying they are difficult, hot-headed, aggressive and always 
want to impose themselves. Moreover, it is believed that they are immoral, come from 
the bottom layers of society and are bamayala or ndumba (whores, in Swahili and 
lingala). As one army wife put it: ‘In general we have a bad reputation, we spouses 
of soldiers, because some of us are involved in prostitution, steal and are engaged in 
other bad things [mambo ya mayanga].’30  
obviously, many army wives strongly resent these stereotypes and feel that the group 
as a whole is tainted by the behaviour of a few. It seems, however, that civilians are 
aware of the heterogeneity of the group of army wives – many emphasised that each 
individual is different and it is therefore not good to generalise. 
Interaction with neighbours plays an important role in cultivating these more 
nuanced views. Indeed, many army wives said they have good relationships with 
their neighbours. they frequently look after each other’s children, help each other 
when someone is sick and borrow sugar and salt from each other. Some also said 
that when their husbands’ salaries are in arrears and they have nothing to eat, their 
neighbours might give them some food.
however, the intermingling of civilian and military families also causes problems for 
civilians and therefore sometimes ends up confirming stereotypes. Many civilians said 
they fear getting into a conflict with the women and children of army personnel as 
these often turn to their husbands or fathers to settle the affair, sometimes violently. 
others mentioned frequent disputes between army wives and other women around 
the water points, especially where these are scarce. Allegedly, army wives commonly 
jump the queue and try to get water first. Furthermore, house-owners complained 
that military personnel are often late paying the rent due to the irregularity of military 
salaries. In rare cases, families may even leave when the husband is redeployed, 
without paying what they owe.
Certain units have put agreements in place with 
local health care structures to ensure that military 
personnel and families pay their medical bills
the CoSt oF MeDICAl CARe 
IS oFten pRohIBItIve
It is not only the neighbours of military families who experience an enhanced risk 
of conflicts and unpaid debts. other civilians and, particularly, civilian health care 
structures, encounter similar problems. Soldiers and their families commonly frequent 
civilian health care centres and hospitals, but are unable to pay their share of the costs 
of medical care. Some are also reluctant to pay as they believe that the military should 
take care of this. Consequently, soldiers and their families frequently leave without 
paying, driving civilian health care structures into financial difficulties.31 As staff of the 
hospital in Sange testified: 
there is not really a system of payment. Some escape payment as they have 
no money. this is why we try to reduce the tariffs for wives of soldiers who 
are deprived of means … the oMeD (officier médical, medical officer) never 
assures the payment for any military wife that is treated here, but sometimes 
the hierarchy pays a little, for instance when it is the wife of the bodyguard of a 
certain commander.32 
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there are important differences in payment practices among different military units. 
Certain units have put agreements in place with local health care structures to ensure 
that military personnel and families pay their medical bills. Such arrangements stipulate 
that sick soldiers first have to go to the oMeD, who makes a diagnosis and draws up 
a bon de référence (document of referral, sometimes also called bon de santé or health 
voucher). only soldiers and dependants with a document from the oMeD are treated 
at the hospital and the referral number is noted on the bills the hospital sends to the 
unit headquarters each month. the latter then deducts a part of the amount from 
soldiers’ salaries.33 these efforts, however, do little to alleviate the burden of medical 
costs on already impoverished families.
Strategies in the fight for survival
like most other women in the Congo, army wives commonly engage in a variety of 
revenue-generating activities to make ends meet. While some wives reported that their 
husbands receive food rations from their unit, these rations are generally only sufficient 
to feed the family for a few days, so most women have to work to supplement the 
household income. the activities they undertake are diverse and depend partly on 
the rank, socio-economic status and connections of the husband, although individual 
abilities and preferences also play a role. 
As noted above, the economic activities of the army wives who follow their husband 
on deployment are circumscribed by their status as outsiders. they commonly have 
no access to land of their own, although some rent plots in the communities in which 
they reside. In addition, their nomadic existence makes it difficult for them to engage 
in activities with immobile assets, like shops, or to make investments that only yield 
revenue in the longer term. 
ChARCoAl pRoDUCtIon 
IS A SoURCe oF InCoMe 
FoR MAny MIlItARy 
FAMIlIeS, BUt leADS to 
envIRonMentAl pRoBleMS
Food rations are generally only sufficient to feed the 
family for a few days, so most women have to work 
like other low-income households, the poorest families lack the money to make large 
up-front payments, causing them to engage in activities that require little to no prior 
investment, like work as day labourers.  the wife of a corporal explained: 
I help the civilian women pull weeds from the field [of manioc] and then receive 
a sack of 10 kilos when she begins the harvest. When the salary of my husband 
does not arrive in time I also accompany civilian women to the fields. I work there 
for 2000 Franc Congolais [(FC), approximately US$2.2] a day, and sometimes I 
go crushing cassiterite [a tin ore] in the mining site to earn 3000FC [approximately 
US$3.3] a day. I can also do the laundry for families who have the means.34 
Depending on the quantity of clothes, doing laundry reportedly does not yield much 
income, only about US$1-2 a day. tasks in richer people’s households, like cleaning 
the house, may yield a bit more. 
Some of these day-labourer activities, especially working the land and mineral 
crushing, entail very hard physical labour. Some women said they work each day from 
6am to noon on the land, often with the youngest child on their back. But when they 
come home, tired after a morning of hard labour, the work does not stop. they still 
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need to fetch water, cook, clean the house, take care of the 
children, do laundry and go to the market. 
Another exhausting job many army wives engage in is helping 
their husbands with the production of braises (charcoal). 
While the husband cuts down the trees, the wife transports 
the charcoal to sell at the market. the limited revenue this 
activity yields constitutes a crucial means of survival for the 
poorest families. however, the deforestation resulting from 
large-scale charcoal production by military families creates 
substantial environmental problems. this highlights how 
the consequences of the military’s poor service conditions 
reverberate throughout society.
Another popular form of revenue generation among military 
wives is petty trade, an activity that generally has small profit 
margins. For example, a woman trading in palm oil said it 
takes almost a week to sell a 20 litre jerry can of palm oil, 
and that reselling it yields a profit of only US$1.6.35 the goods 
in which army wives trade are diverse and include maize 
and cassava flour, fruit and vegetables, cigarettes, fish (both 
fresh and dried), sugar, peanuts, soap, and so called divers 
(various small items commonly used in the household, such as 
batteries, matches, plastic combs and mirrors). 
the modalities of this trade differ. While some women only 
buy from local suppliers and then retail locally, others travel in 
order to get the merchandise from middlepersons or suppliers. 
Although this requires a higher investment, it offers higher 
profit margins. For example, army wives in the gold mines in 
Misisi (Fizi territory) said that in order to buy fish, they travel to 
Baraka, while others go to Kalemie (in north Katanga), both on 
the shore of lake tanganyika.  
Army wives can also be found selling items, mostly foodstuffs, 
that they have produced themselves. Some women in the 
east make and sell chikwange, a type of manioc bread that is 
predominantly consumed in the western parts of the Congo. 
others produce tangawizi (a ginger drink), kanyanga, (a local 
alcoholic brew made of maize and cassava waste), or ndazi 
(beignets). however, producing beignets requires substantial 
prior investment in ingredients like sugar, flour and cooking oil, 
and renting kitchen utensils. therefore, most women have to 
pool resources in order to engage in this activity. As a result, 
the limited profits – about US$7-9 a week – have to be shared. 
Moreover, selling the beignets takes a considerable amount of 
time. thus, children are often required to assist with this task. 
Most army wives, who have limited savings of their own, 
depend primarily on their husbands’ salaries in order to 
undertake economic activities. Consequently, the regular 
delays in military salary disbursements hamper continuity 
in revenue generation. Many women said that when their 
husbands have not received their wages for more than two 
months, they are forced to stop trading and can only take up 
jobs as day labourers or engage in activities that do not require 
up-front investment. 
Such downturns in trade flows are all the more problematic 
since many of the clients of military wives are other military 
families and soldiers, often part of the same unit. therefore, 
delays in salary disbursement tend to have knock-on effects, 
depressing the entire local economy in and around military units.
When salaries continue to be delayed, 
the only option is often to take out 
loans at usurious interest rates, 
sometimes as high as 50%
In order to continue trading despite salary arrears, many women 
ask civilian suppliers to sell them goods on credit. however, 
this is generally only successful where army wives have built 
up long-standing relationships with suppliers. Civilian business 
people tend to distrust military wives as they know they might 
experience ruptures in income, causing them to pile up debts. 
therefore, they only agree to extend credit when they have 
done business with them for some time. this initial distrust is 
another reason why frequent rotations are difficult for military 
wives, forcing them to construct such relationships from scratch 
in every new deployment location. 
When debts – not only to suppliers but also for unpaid rent 
and school fees – pile up after two or three months of delays 
in receiving salaries, and it becomes increasingly difficult to 
finance basic necessities like food and charcoal, army wives 
often start selling items, such as clothes or furniture. yet, poor 
families in particular have few belongings beyond the most 
basic necessities. therefore, when salaries continue to be 
delayed, the only option is often to take out loans at usurious 
interest rates, sometimes as high as 50%. Such loans may also 
be provided by superior officers or their wives. this so-called 
Banque Lambert system is widespread in the Congo and has 
devastating consequences as it causes people to become 
caught up in cycles of debt. As the wife of a soldier explained: 
When we run out of money we are forced to take 
out a loan [kuomba deni], like we borrow 20 000FC 
[approximately US$22], then we pay back 10 000FC 
[approximately US$11). With that, and as we have bought 
on credit and have arrears with the rent, when the salary of 
my husband finally arrives he immediately has to pay back 
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the major and all debts and over half is immediately gone. And then at the end of 
the month we begin again incurring debts.37 
Manipulating the army status
the difficulties described above make women more likely to make use of their status 
as army wives by claiming certain benefits, such as exemptions from taxation, or 
to violate rules and regulations, including by engaging in illegal activities. Civilian 
authorities are generally reluctant to address such conduct as they want to avoid 
getting into trouble with the military. When she feels she has been treated in an 
inappropriate manner, a military wife may turn to her husband and his contacts within 
the military, who will pressurise the civilians involved. 
While the situation differs in each area, in many cases army wives pay few or no 
taxes. For instance, they generally refuse to pay the taxe d’étalage (display tax) of 
US$0.6 at the market. According to a market authority in Uvira: ‘they do not pay at 
any of the markets in Uvira [territory]. they say, “We are the wives of the military, our 
husband is not paid, so we do not have to pay.”’38 In the gold mining area of Misisi, 
where many army wives run nganda (bars) and other places where people drink 
(buvettes), they reportedly do not have the required permits, including a US$100 
licence to sell alcohol.39 
In MAny CASeS, ARMy WIveS 
pAy FeW oR no tAxeS
While most army wives, especially those of the lower 
ranks, struggle to make ends meet, widows are hit 
even harder
Apart from failing to pay taxes and evading other regulations, army wives sometimes 
engage in illegal activities. Whenever civilian authorities try to put a stop to such 
activities or hold those engaging in them to account, the military interferes through so 
called traffic d’influence, implying that they exert pressure on the authorities in question 
to drop the case. however, many authorities are willing to close their eyes in exchange 
for payment. For example, in Uvira town, army wives run illegal drinking venues where 
people smoke bangi or nganja (cannabis), or drink illegal types of alcohol like Sapilo 
or 500. others, particularly wives of officers, engage in trading cannabis. they buy 
it, for example, in cultivation areas in Fizi, then sell it in Uvira, Bukavu and sometimes 
Bujumbura, where a bouteille (bottle, as the measure is called) of cannabis sells for 
three times the Congo price.
Certain army wives are also alleged to be involved in facilitating theft carried out by 
their husbands, especially by selling stolen goods. For example, at the time of the 
Amani leo operations in 2010, there was large-scale theft of small livestock in the 
south of lubero. At the same time, butchers in the town of Kirumba reported that 
army wives were selling meat below the regular price, creating strong suspicions that it 
came from stolen livestock.40 
Army wives are also believed to be involved in theft themselves, mostly the pillaging of 
crops from civilian fields for self-consumption. Some even admitted to doing so. 
one woman said: ‘Sometimes we go at night to the fields of civilians to cut the 
leaves [kukata majani] so we have something to eat with the manioc.’41 According 
$
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to civilians, army wives often cut matembele (the leaves of sweet potato plants) or 
sombe (the leaves of the cassava plant) from their fields. obviously, where this occurs, 
relationships with the population deteriorate rapidly and the negative image that 
civilians commonly have of army wives is confirmed. 
The plight of army widows
While most army wives, especially those of the lower ranks, struggle to make ends 
meet, widows are hit even harder. Although reliable statistics are lacking, there appear 
to be many army widows, notably in the east of the country. Casualty rates in the 
FARDC are high, not least because of the ongoing deployment in combat operations 
and weakly developed structures of emergency care and transport.42 Furthermore, as 
a result of poor diet, ill health and limited access to quality health care, many soldiers 
die of diseases. 
While FARDC widows are officially entitled to their husbands’ salaries, the 
implementation of this policy is challenging. the FARDC generally recognises only 
one woman as having the right to the deceased husband’s salary. however, given 
that soldiers sometimes have multiple partners, it may not be clear who the legitimate 
widow is. Soldiers may, for example, have a first spouse in one part of the country and 
a second spouse elsewhere, with whom they have had children. this second spouse 
may also be the one registered on the lists maintained by the S5 (staff officer in Bureau 
5, charged with the social dimensions of army life, including military spouses). 
When a soldier dies, the first spouse and her family often try to claim the salary, 
implying that the other spouse ends up with nothing. It sometimes also happens 
that the family of the deceased tries to appropriate the salary by getting hold of the 
biometric identification card of the soldier. For instance, in luvungi, we encountered 
a widow whose children had been taken away from her by her brother-in-law in 
Kinshasa, who had also taken her husband’s ID card.
WIDoWS oFten CAnnot oR 
Do not WAnt to RetURn to 
theIR AReA oF oRIGIn
Given that soldiers sometimes have multiple partners, 
it may not be clear who the legitimate widow is
other difficulties faced by widows relate to their position within the FARDC. Some stay 
with the unit of their deceased husband, both because the husband is on the pay list 
of that specific unit and because it constitutes their primary social network. however, 
commanders of some units try to abuse widows’ vulnerable position, for example, by 
giving them only a third of the salary, or by demanding sexual favours in return. 
Because of the bad reputation of army wives, it is generally difficult for widows to find 
a new civilian husband. Furthermore, a substantial number, especially those coming 
from afar, have lost contact with their families, who often live hundreds of kilometres 
away. others cannot afford to make the journey back to their families. Moreover, some 
are orphans or have run away from home because the family did not approve of them 
marrying a soldier. For these reasons, widows often cannot or do not want to return 
to their area of origin. thus, they end up staying with the army unit or in the military 
region where the husband last served, at times marrying another soldier.
In many cases the name of the spouse is eventually administratively transferred from 
the pay lists of the unit to the military region, implying that the widow will thenceforth 
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be paid by the region. this also applies to women whose husbands died before the 
introduction of biometric identification in 2007, when a project sponsored by european 
Union Advisory and Assistance Mission for Security Sector Reform in the DRC (eUSeC 
RD Congo) was launched to identify soldiers by their fingerprints, to create a central 
database of military personnel. these women received an ID card with a photograph, 
which gives them the right to the equivalent of their husbands’ salary. In addition, there 
is a large group of widows from the FARDC’s predecessor forces, an estimated 60 000 
nationwide, who do not fall under the Ministry of Defence but the Ministry of Social 
Affairs and are formally entitled to US$11 a month.43   
Many of the widows registered in the military regions experience problems accessing 
the monthly pay. efforts to count this group have not been systematic and have 
sometimes been engineered to reduce the numbers. For example, in 2011 the 8th 
Military Region (north Kivu) tried to reduce the number of widows by introducing a 
very strict screening process. Consequently, today, many women claim to have been 
unjustly left out, prompting what has now become the 34th Military Region to launch a 
new census. 
the nUMBeR oF elDeRly 
MIlItARy peRSonnel In 
the FARDC Who ShoUlD 
Be RetIReD
Due to the absence of certainty about pensions, 
which have, until now, been regulated erratically, 
many elderly soldiers prefer to stay in the FARDC
even many women who did receive ID cards, or whose husbands are registered on 
the pay list, still do not receive their due. As several told us during the research, it is 
widely believed that some of the money is embezzled at various stages of the payment 
chain.44 yet there is hope for improvement now that a biometric census of army 
widows has been initiated, which is scheduled to be completed before the end 
of 2016. 
however, as previous experiences with the FARDC show, neither biometric 
identification nor payments into bank accounts (a system called bancarisation) are a 
guarantee of (timely) salary payments. Attempts to introduce these systems have met 
with varying success, due to both political and technical obstacles, implying that there 
are still delays in salary disbursement. 
Towards humane human resources management 
In the light of the difficulties detailed above, it is important that the situation of military 
families be improved. Such improvements require initiatives in the domains of the 
social and service conditions of army personnel, including their salaries, and army 
wives’ opportunities for revenue generation and organisation into associations. What is 
the state of play in these policy areas? What efforts have the Congolese government 
and donors made up to now and what more could be done?
Service and social conditions
on paper, the service and social conditions of military personnel and families are well 
organised, at least for officers. In January 2013 parliament adopted a key piece of 
legislation for army reform, the law on the Statute of FARDC personnel (loi 13/005 
portant statut du militaire des FARDC). this law, the elaboration of which was 
60 000
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encouraged by eUSeC, contains many improvements in 
service and social conditions, although most of these are only 
applicable to officers and sous-officiers (non-commissioned 
officers – nCos), exempting the rank and file. 
For example, Article 124 specifies that officers and nCos 









transport provided by the state
the law also states that ‘leave is an inalienable right of a 
soldier’ (Art. 98) and recognises pensions for elderly soldiers 
who have served for more than 22 years. there are at present 
nearly 60 000 elderly military personnel in the FARDC, like the 
husband of Chantal, mentioned at the start of this paper, who 
should be retired. however, due to the absence of certainty 
about pensions, which have, until now, been regulated 
erratically, many elderly soldiers prefer to stay in the FARDC, 
fearing that they will be left without income once they leave.45  
It is obvious that, at present, few of the clauses of the law 
on the Statute of FARDC personnel have been implemented. 
one reason is that in order for the law to come into operation, 
myriad decrees must be adopted. however, not one decree 
has been adopted since the law came into force in 2013. 
Another reason why implementation is lagging behind is 
that it would require the allocation of a vast (and as yet 
uncalculated and unbudgeted) amount of funding, for which 
there is little capacity in the national budget. International 
donors commonly exert pressure on low-income countries to 
keep defence expenditure below 2% of the gross domestic 
product (GDp). Since defence spending was already roughly 
2.3% of GDp in 2013,  improving social conditions without 
downsizing the army, at present comprising about 145 000 
troops, would entail exceeding that threshold.
Despite the fact that it has not been implemented, the law 
on the Statute of FARDC personnel is a valuable starting 
point for improving the social conditions of army personnel 
and could serve as focal point for pressure from national and 
international stakeholders. At the same time, it should be 
acknowledged that it offers no relief for those currently in the 
direst state: the rank and file and their dependants. 
Salary payment 
As illustrated in this paper, the irregularity of salary payments 
has devastating consequences for the household budgets of 
military families, impeding revenue-generating activities and 
dragging families into cycles of debt. Salary payment has been 
the object of long-standing attention within international army 
reform efforts, in particular those of eUSeC. 
From 2007 onwards eUSeC has worked to create payment 
lists coupled to a biometric database, which allows for the 
separation of the chain of command from the chain of salary 
payment. Initially this occurred via payment officials called chefs 
de bureau comptable (CBCs). this system worked reasonably 
well, although it was undermined by constant influxes of rebel 
soldiers and reorganisation. 
At the end of 2012, the government launched an initiative to 
pay salaries directly into individual bank accounts. this decision 
was part of a wider policy of the government formed after the 
2011 elections, initiated by prime Minister Matata ponyo, to pay 
all state agents by bank transfer. 
the implementation of this measure started with the payment of 
officers in Kinshasa and has gradually been extended to other 
parts of the country, although it is not yet in place everywhere. 
Furthermore, a pilot project was organised in areas without 
banking infrastructure to pay military personnel via mobile 
phone. however, this system faced a number of technical and 
practical difficulties and has therefore not been applied on a 
large scale. It can also not be implemented in the vast areas 
that have no mobile phone coverage.47  
At the end of 2012, the government 
launched an initiative to pay salaries 
directly into individual bank accounts
While bancarisation appears to be a step forward, there 
remain serious technical and infrastructural obstacles to its 
implementation, in particular the limited presence of banks in 
rural areas, which causes delays in payment. therefore, salaries 
remain a point of concern.
Army wives’ associations and revenue generation 
Donors have initiated a number of projects aimed at improving 
the socio-economic conditions of army wives, in particular 
stimulating their organisation into associations and their 
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revenue-generating activities. eUSeC has been particularly active in this domain, for 
instance, supporting the foundation of associations for military spouses. this builds on 
a long tradition in the Congo, where self-help associations flourish to compensate for 
limited public service provision. 
either with or without external support, military spouses in many units have organised 
themselves into associations. the modes of organisation and level of activity of these 
structures differ considerably. For example, some of the former Integrated Brigades 
(which were formed at the start of the army integration process between 2004–2008) 
had associations that were quite vibrant and participated actively in community life, 
including in church and non-governmental organisation activities. 
SpoUSeS In lUBeRIZI 
tRIeD DevelopInG 
AGRICUltURAl ACtIvItIeS
Either with or without external support, military 
spouses in many units have organised themselves 
into associations
Military bases may also be home to active associations of military spouses, as is the 
case in luberizi in South Kivu. Between 2010 and 2012 spouses there tried to develop 
common agricultural activities, in particular breeding schemes for small livestock and 
large-scale cultivation with tractors.48 however, the situation in luberizi was exceptional 
as the core of the committee was made up of the spouses of permanent staff, such as 
instructors, who are not redeployed as frequently as the spouses of soldiers serving in 
operational units. 
While associations can advance military spouses’ interests, they are not free from 
the power relations that permeate the military as a whole. Indeed, it is often the wife 
of the unit or camp commander who heads the association, which ensures that the 
command exercises a level of control. For the same reason, commanders have tried 
to block efforts to organise elections for the president of the association of military 
spouses, as was once proposed by eUSeC in north Kivu.49 
Associations of military spouses may also become immersed in party politics. For 
instance, in 2009, during a visit by president Joseph Kabila to the Ruzizi plain, the 
association of military wives of the 8th Integrated Brigade in Sange put their pagnes 
(cloth worn by women) on the road to welcome him. the demonstration was 
orchestrated by the wife of the brigade commander, who headed the association, 
but was criticised by those who were less happy with the Kabila government’s 
military policies.50  
Another problem is that some associations of military spouses are organised on an 
ethnic basis, not unlike the mutuelles (self-help organisations) that developed during 
the Zaire era. By hampering cross-ethnic collective action, such organisations might 
undermine transformations of the power relations that are at the root of adverse 
social conditions.
Despite these limitations, it would seem that associations for military spouses have 
the potential to contribute to better living conditions, at least where they address the 
structural conditions that disadvantage military spouses. this also applies to 
socio-economic projects. however, up to now, only a few donors have invested in 
such projects. 
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Most of these interventions have been in the domain of agriculture. For example, in 
2010, the Food and Agriculture organisation trained and provided seeds and tools 
to the wives of FARDC soldiers of the 12th Integrated Brigade in order to promote the 
cultivation of vegetables like cabbage, onions and lenga-lenga.51  
While these agricultural projects were appreciated, several of the associations for army 
wives encountered expressed the wish to receive vocational training and equipment 
in other economic sectors as well. For example, some said they would prefer sewing 
machines and equipment for soap-making, while others were keen to access micro-
credit. however, it is not guaranteed that providing such items and training will result 
in sustainable improvements to army wives’ living conditions, especially if other 
dimensions of their socio-economic life remain unchanged. 
Conclusion
Around the world, families of military personnel deployed to war zones live in a special 
situation, forced to cope with constant anxiety about the fate of loved ones. In the 
Congo, such anxieties are compounded by severe socio-economic difficulties, which 
are partly caused by poor service conditions. 
these difficulties are also one of the reasons why many women follow their husbands 
on deployment, even into dangerous zones. While military wives have thus become 
closely integrated with the FARDC, the army has few policies in place to cope with or 
disincentivise their presence in operational zones. As a consequence, the women are 
largely thrown back on their own perseverance and mutual solidarity, drawing on 
fragile relationships both within the military and in ever-changing civilian contexts.
Around the world, families of military personnel 
deployed to war zones live in a special situation, 
forced to cope with constant anxiety 
Up to now, donor attention to improving the social conditions of military personnel and 
their families has been limited and incoherent. the output-oriented and project-based 
nature of interventions in army reform, which are generally geared towards direct, 
visible results, tends to undermine their effectiveness and sustainability. Importantly, 
many projects do little to change the structural conditions that are at the root of the 
plight of military families, such as women’s continuing dependence on their husbands’ 
irregularly paid salaries for economic activities. Furthermore, like army reform efforts in 
general, interventions often pay little heed to the interdependence of the military and 
civilian contexts. 
While there are no easy solutions to the immensely complex task of reforming the 
FARDC, using the everyday realities of the rank and file and their families as a point of 
departure might offer a way forward.
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